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Mika v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 71 (Sep. 24, 2015)1
Contracts: Arbitration Agreements
Summary
The court denied extraordinary writ relief from the district court’s decision to
compel arbitration between Petitioners and their employer based on a long-form
arbitration agreement signed only by the Petitioners, and federal law favoring arbitration
agreements.2
Background
I.
Petitioners Donald Mika, Beryl Harter, and Dennis Tallman all signed short-form
and long-form arbitration agreements with their former employer, and real party in
interest, CPS Security (USA), Inc. The identical long-form agreements included a clause
waiving the right to initiate or participate in any class action lawsuit against CPS or any
of its representatives.
After disputes regarding minimum wage and overtime claims, Petitioners brought
separate class action styled lawsuits against CPS in state court. The two suits were
assigned to the same district court judge who denied Petitioners’ motions for class
certification and entered orders compelling individual arbitration of Mika’s, Harter’s, and
Tallman’s claims.
Petitioners argued the long-form arbitration agreement, including the class action
waiver, was invalid because (1) it was not countersigned by CPS and (2) the class action
waiver violates state and federal law.
Discussion
II.
While the parties did not adequately address the requirements for extraordinary
writ relief through their briefs, the court still accepted mandamus review for two reasons.
First, Kindred v. Second Judicial Dist. Court3 may have led the parties to believe the lack
of a right of interlocutory direct appeal made mandamus readily available. Second,
petitioners presented a nonfrivolous argument that the National Labor Relations Act 4
(NLRA) invalidates class waivers in employment arbitration agreements even though the
court’s decision to invalidate class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements in
Picardi v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court5 was contradicted by the subsequent decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.6
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The court questioned any interpretation of Kindred that suggests a writ of
mandamus should automatically be granted from an order compelling arbitration.
Because NRS § 38.247(a)(1) does not provide for direct interlocutory appeals from an
order compelling arbitration, 7 Kindred concluded that petitioners have no remedy
available other than an extraordinary writ. 8 However, the court clarified that a party
seeking writ relief still needs to show why an eventual appeal after final judgment will
not serve as a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” pursuant to NRS § 34.170.9
III.
The threshold question was whether the long-form arbitration agreement and class
waiver clause were part of a valid contract even though CPS did not sign the agreement.
The court concluded NRS § 38.219(1) requires an arbitration agreement be in writing, but
does not require the agreement be signed to be enforceable.10 It made sense for CPS not
to pre-sign the long-form arbitration agreement because the signing employee had a 30day opt-out period. Therefore, petitioners accepted the terms of the long-form agreement
after they did not timely opt out during the 30-day period.
Petitioners Mika and Harter also argued that they sued additional defendants that
were not parties to the CPS arbitration agreements and therefore those parties couldn’t
enforce the arbitration agreements. However, the court found the contract, by its own
terms and by general principles of agency, included all of the defendants named in
Petitioners Mika and Harter’s complaint.
IV.
A.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion abrogates this courts decision in
Picardi. In Picardi, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that class action waivers violate
Nevada public policy, and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not force states to
enforce arbitration agreements that violate the public policy of the state. 11 Similarly, the
California Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior Ct. that class action waivers
are unconscionable in consumer contracts when the amounts disputed are too
insignificant to be prosecuted individually, thus allowing the stronger party to escape
liability.12 However, in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Federal Arbitration
Act preempted California’s Discover Bank rule.13
Petitioners’ argued, and the court rejected, that even though Concepcion abrogates
Picardi just as fully as it abrogates Discover Bank, Concepcion is distinguishable from
the facts of this case because (1) Concepcion is limited to consumer arbitration
agreements; and (2) Concepcion only applies to cases in federal court, not state court.
The court ruled Concepcion prevents a state court from invalidating a class waiver
in an arbitration agreement, when the claims involve commerce, on the basis that
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individual arbitration of the employee’s state law claims for overtime and minimum wage
would be ineffective. The court followed the analysis of the California Supreme Court in
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC.14 In Iskanian, the court decided that
even if a rule against class waivers in arbitration agreements is stated narrowly, it is not
saved from FAA preemption and Concepcion. 15 As a result, the California Supreme
Court upheld a district court order compelling arbitration in a class action wage claim
brought in the employment context. 16 Here, the court agreed with the reasoning of
Iskanian and found that nothing in Concepcion suggests that FAA preemption does not
apply broadly in other contexts such as state law wage and hour claims.
The court also found that as long as commerce is involved, the FAA applies.
Thus, when the FAA applies, contradictory state law is preempted whether the claim is
brought in federal or state court.17 So, even though the right to a minimum wage is so
important that the Nevada Constitution secures it,18 petitioners are still not entitled to
litigate on a class basis when petitioners have agreed to arbitrate claims on an individual
basis.19
B.
Petitioners also argued, as decided by the National Labor Relations Board in In re
D.R. Horton, Inc. (“Horton I”), 20 that the National Labor Relations Act provides a
“contrary congressional command” that overrides the FAA. 21 Section 7 of the NLRA
grants employees the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 22 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
then provides that an employer cannot “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” in
exercising the rights established by Section 7. As arbitration agreements force employees
to give up their Section 8 right to collective procedures for their own “mutual aid or
protection,” Horton I held that Section 8 of the NLRA made it illegal for employers to
require employees to arbitrate employment-related claims on an individual basis.23 The
NLRB found its decision was not contrary to the FAA, because the FAA does not require
enforcement of illegal contracts.24
However, in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB (“Horton II”), the Fifth Circuit overruled
Horton I’s finding that class arbitration waivers were illegal. 25 The Fifth Circuit found
that the NLRB’s decision in Horton I essentially prohibited class waivers in arbitration
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agreements, and was therefore “an actual impediment to arbitration [that] violates the
FAA.”26
Ultimately, the court followed the overwhelming majority of courts, including
Horton II and Iskanian, and found that Horton I’s invalidation of class arbitration waivers
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the FAA in Concepcion.
The court reasoned that the FAA’s broad policy favoring arbitration is not sufficiently
contradicted by Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA to permit invalidation of class waiver
clauses in arbitration agreements.
V.
The court also upheld the district court’s rejection of Petitioner Tallman’s
argument that CPS waived its right to compel arbitration when it removed Tallman’s
state court action to federal court and then litigated Tallman’s Fair Labor Standards Act
claims. To prove waiver of CPS’ contractual right to arbitration, Tallman needed to show
that “the party seeking to arbitrate (1) knew of his right to arbitrate, (2) acted
inconsistently with that right, and (3) prejudiced the other party by his inconsistent
acts.”27 Prejudice is the focus of the waiver analysis and may be shown when (1) the
parties use discovery not available in arbitration, (2) the parties litigate substantial issues
on the merits, or (3) compelling arbitration would require a duplication of efforts.28
The court found that there was no discovery that would not have been available
through arbitration, because the parties stipulated to not conduct discovery until they
resolved class certification. The court also found that the federal court did not consider
the merits of Tallman’s state law claims or the class certifications when it remanded those
claims back to state court. Therefore, this was not a case where the party seeking
arbitration “test[ed] the judicial waters” before it moved to compel arbitration.29
Finally, the court held that CPS did not automatically waive the right to compel
arbitration by removing the action from state to federal court, 30 and that the issues in
litigation were separate and distinct from any claims that should have been arbitrated. If
anything, the court reasoned that the federal court proceedings actually helped eventual
arbitration of Tallman’s state-law claims.
Conclusion
The district court properly enforced the long-form arbitration agreement by
compelling arbitration of Petitioner’s claims on an individual basis. Petitioners and CPS
had a valid class waiver clause even though CPS did not sign the long-form arbitration
agreement. Thus, the FAA and Concepcion applied and preempted the state from
invalidating the arbitration agreement even if the agreement might be contrary to the
public policy of the state.
26

Id. at 359–60.
Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc. v. Am. Heritage, Inc., 121 Nev. 84, 90, 110 P.3d 481, 485 (2005).
28
Id. at 90–91, 110 P.3d at 485.
29
Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Uwaydah v. Van Wert Cnty.
Hosp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2002)).
30
See Halim v. Great Gasby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2008).
27

4

